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In the final decades of the twentieth century, governments around the world began 
to dramatically change the form and function of old age pension systems. These reforms 
were generally motivated by a combination of population aging, slowing economic 
growth and tightening budget constraints, which led both to rising pension costs and 
declining resources with which governments could finance old age pension liabilities 
(See for example Pierson 1998, 2001). 
Many governments responded to these pressures by revising the parameters of 
traditional defined benefit pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension systems, through 
incremental changes to contribution or benefit rates, retirement age or indexation rules, in 
order to keep pension systems in line with changing economic and demographic trends 
and state fiscal capacity. Other governments, however, opted for more fundamental, 
structural revisions of the design and objectives of old age pension systems through the 
creation of mandatory individual, financial defined contribution (FDC) pension schemes, 
wherein pension benefits are based on individual contributions to a (typically) privately-
managed pension fund, and the market return to capital on those funds.  Throughout the 
1990s, the ideas and technology behind funded pension schemes were disseminated 
broadly throughout the world. By the end of the decade, more than 20 countries from 
South America to East Asia, Europe and the Former Soviet Union had adopted funded, 
defined-contribution pension schemes either as the dominant ‘pillar’ in mandatory   3
pension schemes, or as part of multi-pillar structural reforms (see for example Brooks, 
2002; Madrid, 2003).
  
By the middle of the 1990s, however, a new model of structural pension reform – 
the non-financial (or notional) defined contribution (NDC) scheme – had also emerged. 
The NDC approach was the key feature of a national pension reform in Sweden that was 
adopted as framework legislation in 1994 and as final legislation in 1998.  Latvia, Italy 
and Poland followed Sweden’s lead. By the end of the decade, the NDC model had 
spread to Latin America, as Brazil adopted a pension reform that contains elements of 
NDC (Pinheiro, 2004). 
Non-financial defined contribution pensions combine the pay-as-you-go financing 
that is characteristic of traditional defined benefit (DB) schemes with the defined 
contribution (DC) structure of individual accounts.   NDC schemes tie benefits closely to 
individual contribution history over an entire working life, but credit those contributions 
with a notional interest rate tied to wage growth or overall economic growth rather than 
return in financial markets.  Notional accounts, however, contain no real capital that can 
be claimed at retirement as a lump-sum or to purchase an annuity in the private market. 
Instead, at the time of retirement, the government converts the notional account balance 
into an annuity on the basis of cohort life expectancy, and finances this benefit on a pay-
as-you-go basis. 
Although NDC pension schemes represent an important departure from both the 
incremental reforms of defined-benefit schemes and from individual account, pre-funded-
DC models, many of the individual elements of the NDC scheme design that allow it to 
control costs are not new; they have been utilized on an ad hoc and often temporary basis 
in incremental reforms to pay-as-you-go DB pension schemes. The originality of NDC   4
lies primarily in combining those elements into a coherent package with a clear policy 
objective, and imbuing that package with presumed perpetuity. 
A number of “good policy” arguments have been advanced for adopting NDC 
measures.  Proponents cite the enhanced ‘fairness’ associated with the DC formula as 
compared to DB schemes that base retirement benefits on the last salary or last few years’ 
wages, which tend to redistribute implicitly toward high-income workers with steeper 
earnings profiles.  NDC schemes make any redistribution more explicit by removing it 
from the main pillar of the pension scheme and creating a separate scheme with the 
limited goal of poverty reduction, displacing the principles of universality or solidarity 
that underpinned (whether in theory or reality) most traditional social insurance systems. 
Supporters of NDC-based reforms also argue that the tighter link between contributions 
and benefits strengthens incentives to work later in life, and thus improves system 
financing, while enhancing individual responsibility and work effort.  While evidence for 
these claims is limited, the argument has entered prominently in government 
justifications for adoption of this scheme. 
Perhaps the greatest potential advantage offered by NDC reform, however, is the 
perception of permanency, and hence credibility, that it imparts to the social security 
system. By reducing the need for governments to intervene regularly to adjust pension 
system parameters, the ‘political risk’ of policy change in response to political pressures 
associated with public pension systems is significantly reduced.   Reinforcing this sense 
of permanency of the NDC scheme is the sense of “ownership” felt by workers who 
receive regular statements tracking their rising notional account balances.  This sense of 
property rights is said to create a ‘lock-in’ effect that deters politicians from intervening 
to arbitrarily reduce or confiscate the notional capital accumulated in the NDC accounts.    5
For politicians, NDC pension reforms offer an opportunity to stabilize pension 
contribution rates over the long-term as populations age, while limiting pensioners’ 
exposure to fluctuations in investment and annuity markets. Equally important, the 
complexity of the NDC scheme creates important opportunities to limit traceability and 
blame for benefit retrenchment: automatic adjustment mechanisms based on economic 
and demographic trends absolve politicians of responsibility for potential future benefit 
reductions.   Like Ulysses in resisting the Sirens, governments may be able to “lash 
themselves to mast” of a fixed contribution rate and automatic adjustment mechanisms, 
resisting temptations to pay unsustainable benefits to current and future retirees. 
The adoption of NDC schemes may also generate new problems and political 
risks, however.  Because NDC schemes accommodate increasing longevity completely 
through benefit reductions, the goal of stabilizing pension contribution rates may lead to 
substantial erosion of pension values as populations age. To the extent that the benefits 
provided under NDC schemes depart from public expectations regarding the absolute and 
relative value of pensions, politicians may confront a powerful political backlash.  This 
may in turn lead to “loosening of the lashes” on contribution rates and automatic 
adjustments, to contributions to the system from the general government budget, and/or 
to pressure for enhanced "social protection" pensions outside the NDC pillar.  
The spread of Non-financial Defined Contribution-based pension reforms thus 
raises important questions both for social science theory and for pension policymaking.  
From the perspective of social science theory, NDC-based pension reforms represent an 
important example of what Jon Elster has called "pre-commitment" or "self-binding" 
efforts to limit future options in a way that furthers their long-term interests.  Indeed, 
Elster uses the Ulysses and the Sirens metaphor in much of his writing on pre-
commitment (Elster 1979, 2000). NDC based pension reforms can also be seen as  a   6
combination of several blame-avoiding strategies that allows politicians to reconcile their 
policy and political objectives by making politically risky decisions through what Kent 
Weaver (1986, 1988) has called "automatic government" mechanisms rather than 
requiring politicians to make them openly. 
Examining the adoption and implementation of NDC-based pension reforms thus 
provides an opportunity to examine how agenda-limiting pre-commitment mechanisms 
are adopted and how they operate in practice.  Specifically, which governments are most 
likely to consider and adopt NDC-based reforms? Do these reforms actually succeed in 
de-politicizing painful and costly pension retrenchment decisions and limiting blame to 
incumbent politicians, or do they have a tendency to spark resistance that undercuts their 
intended effects? 
In the first section of the paper we briefly outline the characteristics of Non-
financial Defined Contribution pension systems, arguing that NDC pension schemes 
should be seen as a set of principles that may be more or less closely followed in practice. 
The second section develops a framework for analyzing why NDC pension systems have 
increasingly been on the agenda in recent years and discusses conditions that facilitate 
consideration and adoption of NDC-based reform, including the complex question of why 
there has been a stronger move toward adopting NDC in some countries and regions than 
others. The third section of the paper examines implementation challenges that may arise 
in NDC systems as they are adopted and mature, as well as their political sustainability. 
The final section of the paper assesses the prospects for a further spread of NDC pension 
systems.  In short, the paper asks whether and under what conditions adoption of NDC 
pensions is likely to be an effective means of allowing politicians to "lash themselves to 
the mast" of a stabilized contribution rate and depoliticize the process of pension 
retrenchment. This, in turn, plays into the broader question of whether LDC-based   7
reforms are likely to play a major role in addressing the immense aging issue facing both 
developed and developing societies in coming decades. 
I. HOW NDC WORKS  
Although the NDC system represents a synthesis of the PAYG- DB and FF-DC 
systems, it differs from these in the way it apportions risk and reward, and in its likely 
political consequences.   Although notional accounts share with funded DC schemes a 
tight link between pension benefits and individual contributions, NDC systems are by 
design not advance-funded, although they typically include a small buffer fund. 
NDC and funded DC schemes also differ in their treatment of capital market risks. 
By using a notional interest rate, NDC schemes diminish individuals’ exposure to 
fluctuations in market rates of return and annuity prices associated with privately 
managed funded-DC schemes, which may significantly reduce pension values during 
accumulation and retirement.  Workers in NDC schemes continue to be exposed to 
significant demographic risks, such as unanticipated gains in longevity and declines in 
fertility in retirement, which by shrinking the overall contribution base to the pension 
system, imply declines in pension benefits in order to maintain overall financial balance 
of the NDC system (Palmer and Góra, 2003).
2  At the same time, the annual indexation of 
annuities to wage growth exposes retired workers to the risk of declines in benefits if 
wages and productivity fall. 
NDC systems also differ from traditional DB schemes in important ways, as 
shown in the second and fifth columns of Table 1. But as the third and fourth columns of 
the table show, a number of "middle positions" between DB and NDC pension schemes 
are possible on many of these key elements of pension system design.  Many elements 
associated with NDC pension systems have been enacted as ad hoc reforms of existing 
DB pension systems (column 3).  And NDC-based systems sometimes take a “weak” or   8
“partial” form, with one or more provisions that make them less than fully self-sustaining 
or inclusive (column 4).  Table 1 divides these elements of pension system structure into 
four categories: structural features, coverage, time horizon, and exclusivity.  
Structural Features 
A wide range of variation is possible on multiple dimensions of the structural 
features of pension systems (Table 1). For example, while most DB pension schemes 
operate largely on a pay-as-you-go basis, the Swedish NDC scheme incorporates "buffer 
funds" that pre-fund some benefits and protect against small dips in contributions and 
demographic bulges in the population of retirees.
3 
With respect to population aging—and in particular rising life expectancy at 
retirement--PAYG-DB schemes generally do not make provision for automatic 
adjustments to the changing demographic, social and economic context in which the 
system is embedded. Thus as populations age, they may require periodic government 
intervention to adjust benefit levels or retirement ages. NDC schemes automatically 
accommodate demographic change by calculating annuities on the basis of individual 
accumulations and life expectancy at the time of retirement. But such measures can also 
be included in DB schemes to partially or fully adjust for population aging, for example 
the Kohl government's "demographic factor" enacted as part of a short-lived pension 
reform and the “sustainability factor” enacted by the current Schröder government 
(Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2003).  Similarly, DB schemes generally include a fixed 
standard retirement age, usually with some sort of adjustment (which varies greatly 
across countries in its actuarial accuracy) for earlier or later retirement. A number of 
countries have raised the standard age in recent years in response to population aging. 
The Swedish NDC scheme, on the other hand, has replaced the standard retirement age 
with a flexible retirement ages (income pensions can be drawn no earlier than age 61),    9
no upward age at which pension rights can be earned, and actuarial adjustments for 
earlier or later retirement. But NDC-like proposals have also been made for retirement 
age changes in DB, such as proposals in the United States that would raise the age for 
receipt of "full" Social Security entitlements as longevity increases. 
Perhaps the most distinctive attribute of NDC pension systems is the fixing of a 
long-term contribution rate and wage base, usually with the adjustment of the latter for 
some index of wages.  With this "lashing to the mast" on contribution rates, future 
adjustments to keep pension systems sound must in theory be made on the benefit side. 
For DB pensions operated on PAYG basis, on the other hand, payroll tax contribution  
rates and wage bases are usually adjusted on an ad hoc basis as current funding needs 
change.  A number of countries also use general revenues or some other form of revenue 
(e.g., the German eco-tax) to finance part of their pension system costs.  Given increased 
longevity in most countries and flagging employment growth in a number of countries, 
there has been strong upward pressure on DB pension contribution rates over the past 
thirty years. Blöndal and Scarpetta, in a survey of 18 OECD countries, found that pension 
contribution rates rose from an average of 9.3 percent in 1967 to 16.5 percent in 1995; the 
average contribution rate was 1.88 times its 1967 level in 1995 (Blöndal and Scarpetta: 
1997, pp.17-18). 
In response to this trend, many countries have in recent years tried to stabilize 
contribution rates to their defined benefit pensions through a variety of mechanisms. In 
Canada, for example, the federal and provincial governments have pledged to keep 
payroll taxes under 10 percent in the long term; if  benefit costs are projected to exceed 
that target within a specified projection period, a combination of benefit cuts and 
contribution rate increases is automatically triggered.
4 Germany, where pension 
contribution rates peaked at over 20 percent of earnings in recent years, has also acted to   10
try to stabilize contribution rates at no more than 20 percent through the year 2020 and 22 
percent through 2030 (Gern: 2002, p. 457). In the United States, congressional 
Republicans made it very clear at the time of the 1983 Social Security rescue package 
that they would tolerate no further increases in contribution rates, and there have been 
none (Light, 1995). In short, even without the explicit "lashing to the mast" of 
contribution rates associated with NDC pension reforms, DB systems can and have 
undertaken a number of actions to stabilize contribution rates.  
DB and NDC pension systems also differ significantly in their potential for 
intergenerational redistribution.  DB pensions typically offer a much higher rate of return 
on contributions to the first generations in the program, when the ratio of contributors to 
beneficiaries is much higher than in later generations (especially as longevity increases). 
NDC pensions, on the other hand, are intended to restrict intergenerational redistribution.  
However, many DB pension schemes (e.g., in Canada and the United States) have also 
moved to restrict intergenerational redistribution by making very long-term projections of 
contribution rates and benefit costs and developing contribution rates and benefit levels 
that are stable over that projection period. 
Finally, there are strong differences in principle in the way that DB and NDC 
systems treat redistribution within generations. The underlying principle of a DC scheme 
is that the present value of an individual’s benefits in any time are equal to the present 
value of  that individual’s contributions in the same period.  If overall assets of the 
system decline, benefits adjust automatically to return financial balance to the pension 
system. This is not the case in DB systems, where the benefit rate is fixed as a social 
objective, and frequently implies some degree of intragenerational redistribution of 
income.  If DB system assets decline, either due to demographic change or early 
retirement, contributions must be adjusted to restore financial balance.
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In principle, NDC schemes treat all contributions to the system the same in terms 
of accruing credits (with adjustments for wage or GDP growth over time): only actual 
contributions accrue credits, and all credits result in equal payouts (actuarially adjusted 
for life expectancy at retirement).
6  Even NDC systems may contain some elements of 
redistribution in payout, however, notably in the use of gender neutral annuitization 
tables that do not reflect real gender differences in life expectancy.   
Many DB schemes include more complex patterns of redistribution.  Some 
countries, notably the United States, offer higher replacement rates for the first dollars of 
earnings, effectively offering a higher replacement rate for low-earners. Many DB 
schemes also base benefits on a contributor's highest or final number of earnings years 
(for example, the highest three, fifteen, or twenty years). To the extent that the benefit 
formula is based on final salary or only the latest years’ earnings, it privileges workers 
with a steeper career earnings profile. Such workers are typically the most affluent and 
better-educated in society In recent years, DB pension systems in many countries have 
been altered to limit redistribution within generations in some ways, for example by 
lengthening the number of contribution years used in calculating pension entitlements or 
flattening replacement rate differentials across earnings levels. But there has also been a 
widespread expansion in non-contributory credits given for care-giving in a number of 
countries. 
The use by NDC schemes of a benefit formula based on contributions over the 
entire career both diminishes  the degree of regressive redistribution caused by final 
salary benefit formulae and at the same time eliminates the possibility for progressive 
redistribution of pension benefits.  The overall progressivity of a retirement income 
system thus depends critically on the existence of mechanisms within or outside the NDC 
scheme to progressively reapportion risk and benefits to the least well-off.  This can be   12
done in either of two ways.  First, contributions can be made (or more problematically, 
imputed)  for individuals that increase their benefit entitlement: in Sweden and Latvia, for 
example, contributions are made into the system for periods spent in care-giving, military 
service, while Sweden contributes also for time spent in unemployment and higher 
education. Second, changes may be made in other tiers of the retirement income system 
that "reinvent" or alter existing redistributive elements; indeed without an adjustment of 
other pension tiers to ease the transition, the distributional change resulting from a change 
to NDC is likely to impose such heavy costs on some groups that its chances of winning 
adoption and being sustained are called into question.  
Time Horizon 
  Pension reforms can also be distinguished by their phase-in periods.  The U.S. 
increase of retirement age from 65 to 67, for example, is being phased in over almost 40 
years from when it was enacted to when it will be fully in effect.  NDC reforms also 
show great differences in the time horizon over which they are phased in. In theory, NDC 
reforms could be applied even to those who have retired already, if adequate contribution 
records exist.  In the 1988 Swedish reform, for example, all workers born after 1953 are 
entirely in the new system; earlier cohorts born between 1937 and 1953 are partially in 
the new system.  In Italy, on the other hand, only new entrants to the labor market have 
their benefits  fully calculated under the new NDC rules. A longer phase-in period is 
likely to weaken opposition from the most attentive publics—the elderly and near-
elderly—but it also lessens near-term budgetary savings from reform. 
Coverage 
Countries can also differ in the degree to which the NDC system will apply to all 
members of the workforce when it is fully phased in.  In Brazil, for example, the quasi-
NDC system instituted in 1999 applies only to private sector workers. Excluding key   13
sectors (e.g., the military) from a shift to NDC may help governments manage the politics 
of reform, although doing so clearly raises questions of equitable treatment.  
Exclusivity 
Most countries  in the world have multi-pillar pension systems. Thus even when 
an NDC system is fully phased in, it may not be the sole, or even the largest, source of 
public pension income.  The 1998 pension reform in Sweden, for example, created a 
multi-pillared pension scheme in which the average wage worker could expect to receive 
a retirement pension from an NDC account and a mandatory individual pension account. 
There is also a garantipension financed from general revenues for low-wage workers and 
workers with interrupted earnings histories, which tops up their accumulated pension 
accounts to a socially-acceptable minimum. The NDC tier is dominant however--
financed by a 16% payroll contribution, compared to a contribution of 2.5% of covered 
wages into funded individual accounts.  The Polish government similarly adopted a 
mixed, NDC and funded-DC scheme, wherein 15 percent of covered wages are credited 
to the first (NDC) pillar and indexed with a notional interest rate equal to growth in the 
covered wage bill. Nine percent of covered wages are transferred to the funded scheme in 
Poland, and invested according to market principles (Góra and Rutkowski, 2000). The 
Latvian pension reform also combines an NDC pillar with a funded-DC scheme. The 
NDC pillar is financed with contributions of 20% of covered wages, indexed to the 
growth in the wage bill (average wages plus labor market growth.)  The funded scheme, 
which came into force in 2001, receives 2% of covered wages, which is expected to be 
gradually increased to 10% by 2010 (Fox and Palmer, 1999). 
 
Overall, the preceding discussion suggests that a political analysis of Non-
financial Defined Contribution pension systems must recognize that the boundaries   14
between and NDC and DB pensions are fuzzy rather than sharp.  Not only have many 
elements of NDC long been used in DB incremental reforms on an ad hoc basis, as noted 
above, but many countries adopting NDC have done so in a partial and potentially 
unstable way. Italy, for example, imputes contributions to notional accounts higher than 
those that are actually made, does not have automatic stabilizers, does not automatically 
take into account pre- or post-retirement increases in longevity, and has a set, inflexible 
rate of return on accumulated contributions.(Franco and Sartor, 2003). If incomplete 
adoption of NDC is possible, so too presumably is an incomplete dismantling: thus an 
analysis of NDC politics must also include an assessment of the risks of an ad hoc 
unraveling of NDC reforms. 
Moreover, despite the tighter link between contributions and benefits, many NDC 
schemes bear the heavy imprint of political values, objectives, and concessions to 
powerful domestic political groups. For instance, governments may intervene in the 
accumulation phase of the NDC system to credit socially-valued activities that are not 
rewarded by markets, such as the provision of credits for child rearing, education and 
military service. At the same time, powerful groups such as the military or specific 
industrial sectors may claim privileges within the NDC framework to the extent that 
governments credit notional accounts for workers in these sectors to finance special 
benefits such as early retirement.
7   The use of unisex mortality tables likewise represent 
a political decision to redistribute from men to women. The redistribution of credits 
accumulated by workers who die before retirement  also represents a political judgement 
in which the  claim of survivors within the family is weighed against those of workers 
within the cohort, to whom such credits are otherwise apportioned (as in Sweden).  
 
II. THE POLITICS OF NDC INNOVATION, DIFFUSION AND ADOPTION   15
The discussion above suggests some important general propositions about the 
politics of adopting NDC-focused pension reforms.  First, it suggests that while NDC-
based reforms have some features that may be politically attractive for re-election 
oriented politicians—in particular the capacity for politicians to distance themselves from 
long-term benefit and eligibility cuts--they are not without political drawbacks as well. 
Second, it suggests that the attitudes of important actors in pension reform 
politics—notably Finance Ministries, trade unions and groups representing retirees—to 
pension reform are likely to be heavily influenced by what else is in the pension reform 
package, notably what protections are afforded to the aged through the provision of 
income-tested pensions or supplemental DC pensions to compensate for any losses, and 
who is expected to pay for the costs for those parts of the reform package.   
Third, this analysis suggests that proponents of an NDC-based reform may be 
able to affect the political prospects for reform through specific design features in the 
reform.  In particular, the pace of transition strongly influences the degree and visibility 
of the material and distributive effects of NDC reforms, and thus the political viability of 
these measures. If a reform is phased in quickly, the terms of the new scheme are not 
only more costly and transparent, but are also at greater risk of political backlash. Other 
features of NDC program design that are likely to affect a proposal’s political prospects  
include provisions of other pension tiers and how they compensate any losers from shift 
to NDC (e.g., the creation of new income-tested pensions), as well as which groups (e.g., 
civil servants or he military), if any, are excluded from shift to NDC. There may also be 
significant battles over whether and how much to provide credits for non-wage related 
benefits even within an NDC pension scheme, as well as who should pay for those 
credits.   16
Finally, the politics of NDC adoption and rejection is likely to be a moving target.  
How politicians perceive and react to NDC proposals is likely to evolve over time as the 
concept is diffused more broadly among technocratic elites and experience with 
implementation of NDC-based pension regimes grows. 
  This very general overview of the calculus of key actors does not take us very far, 
however, toward understanding why NDC pension reforms are likely to get on 
government’s agenda and win adoption in some countries and not in others, let alone 
whether an NDC-based reform will be sustained once it has been adopted.  In order to 
understand these cross-national variations and how they are likely to evolve over time it 
is important first to introduce contextual factors that vary across countries, notably the 
severity of the challenges that extant pension systems face, the weight of various social 
actors, and the barriers that a political system imposes to instituting major reforms. 
Second, it is important to take a process-oriented approach, distinguishing between the 
forces that are critical at different stages of NDC politics: (1) initial development of the 
NDC idea and its first application, (2) diffusion of the concept to the agendas of other 
countries (3) adoption or rejection of the NDC idea once it is on a government’s agenda 
in a specific country, and (4) sustaining an NDC reform once it is in place. Also 
important is whether NDC is adopted fully or partially—that is, the structural features, 
coverage, time horizon and exclusivity of NDC-based schemes in particular countries. 
We will concentrate here on diffusion and full or partial adoption or rejection, since the 
NDC “innovation” is now well-developed.
8 Sustaining implementation of NDC-based 
reforms will be considered in the next section of the paper. 
Perhaps the most influential framework for examining agenda-setting in policymaking 
was developed by the American political scientist John Kingdon (1995), building on earlier 
work by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) and others.  Kingdon argues that agenda-setting   17
involves interactions between three often independent processes that he calls problem, policy 
and political streams.   In the problem stream, for example, increased attention may be drawn 
to a problem by a highly visible “focusing event” or by a newly developed indicator or an 
indicator that pushes through a highly visible threshold (e.g., pension expenditures reaching 
fifteen percent of GDP or projections that contribution rates will top twenty percent).  In the 
“policy stream,” alternatives are usually developed within  communities of experts in a 
particular policy sector and then refined, revised and recombined over time. Indeed, Kingdon 
(1995, p. 165) argues that “advocates lie in wait, in and around government with their 
solutions in hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their solutions, 
waiting for a development in the political stream they can use to their advantage.”  Policy 
proposals are likely to reach and remain on government’s agenda only if they appear to be 
broadly congruent with the values of policymakers and the public, as well as politically 
feasible, affordable, and both feasible to implement and likely to make some improvement in 
a perceived policy problem. 
  The “political stream” is equally complex.  Politicians are especially likely to give an 
issue additional attention when they sense a “national mood” of concern on an issue to which 
they feel they must respond to or that offers opportunities for credit-claiming. An election 
that leads to change in the personnel leading major governmental institutions may also bring 
new issues to the agenda. 
  Brief opportunities to introduce change occur when the three policy streams come 
together and are “coupled,” often through the efforts of a skilled political entrepreneur.  Even 
if a problem is seen as particularly pressing, it may not remain on the agenda long if there is 
no policy alternative available that seems a plausible alternative for addressing it.  Issues may 
fade off agendas for a number of other reasons: the public and policymakers may become 
inured to an situation, especially if they see it as insoluble, or they may lose interest as the   18
memories fade of a visible event that triggered a lot of attention.  Politicians may also feel 
that a problem has been “solved” after new legislation is passed; only if problems persist, or 
appear in a new form, will an issue reappear on the agenda. 
  Critics of Kingdon’s framework have argued that the multitude of variables 
encompassed in the three policy streams make it a poor vehicle for explanation and 
prediction. Indeed, it is probably better seen as a device for organizing different variables and 
thinking about their interaction than as a theory. Moreover, the framework, which was 
developed to explain the complex and veto point-rich political system of the United States, 
requires some adaptations t o work well in a comparative context. Nonetheless, it does 
suggest a rich set of hypotheses for investigating the politics of NDC pension innovation and 
diffusion across countries. 
We will focus here on four broad sets of variables to explain whether and to what 
extent countries move toward NDC pension reform. First, corresponding to Kingdon’s 
“problem stream,” governments are pressed to reform state pension schemes by varying 
degrees of demographic change, budget pressures and challenges of market competition. 
Second, countries’ exposure to and adoption of NDC ideas may also be influenced by the 
strength of various domestic ideological groupings as well as countries’ interaction with 
supra-national institutional institutions such as the European Union and international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank. NDC ideas may also be diffused through 
formal and informal regional policy networks. These factors constitute important 
developments in what Kingdon calls the “policy stream.”  Third, feedbacks from prior 
policy choices may make consideration and adoption of NDC-based reforms more or less 
likely. Fourth, the structure of political institutions and political competition may affect 
both the degree to which the distinctive political advantages and costs associated with 
NDC systems are present in specific countries and the strength of institutional barriers to   19
policy change.
9 Table 3 outlines hypothesized relationships between specific variables 
and several possible outcomes (e.g., first innovation with NDC, early adoption, partial 
adoption, consideration and rejection of NDC, NDC never reaching agenda).  
The newness of NDC based reforms and the small number of cases of NDC 
adoption make it premature to attempt a statistical analysis of the determinants of NDC-
based reforms. Table 4 has a more modest aim: to develop an informal “scorecard” of the 
relationship between causes and outcomes, showing how several countries that have had 
different NDC outcomes (e.g., Sweden as innovator, Italy as a partial adopter of NDC, 
Uruguay as a country that rejected NDC in favor of a mix of DB and DC, the United 
States as a country where NDC has not yet reached the agenda) rate with respect to 
several hypothesized causal variables. 
Economic-Demographic Pressures for System Change 
The wave of structural pension reforms that swelled in the 1980s and 1990s has 
been widely attributed to significant demographic and economic changes, which raised 
the specter (and reality) of wide deficits in social security budgets, and tighter pressures 
on overall government spending. These developments in the “problem stream” have 
clearly had a major impact on pension reform agendas. 
Aging populations are a critical source of pressure for change in pension schemes. 
Most countries operate their pension systems on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis, even 
where there is a dedicated payroll tax for pensions. Falling birthrates and life expectancy 
increases mean that there are fewer workers to support each retiree--a trend that is only 
expected to increase in future years. Demographic challenges vary significantly across 
nations, however (Kinsella and Velkoff, 2001; European Union, Economic Policy 
Committee, 2001). In general, we would expect that countries that have had a high 
percentage of their populations over aged 65 for an extended period would be most likely   20
to have exhausted incremental retrenchment and contribution reforms and be more likely 
to consider NDC and other sorts of fundamental pension restructuring initiatives. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, many of the early adopters of NDC (notably Sweden and 
Italy) are among the world’s oldest societies. 
Fiscal concerns also increased pressure for austerity in public pension systems. 
Rising government deficits and debt/GDP ratios are clearly likely to raise pressures for 
pension reform. But the effects of such a fiscal crunch are complex. Indeed, a quantitative 
study of 57 developed and developing countries has shown that countries with a high 
public debt to GDP ratio are less likely to privatize their pension programs  (at least when 
pension liabilities are low or moderate), because they cannot afford the transitional costs 
associated with moving from a public PAYG to fully-funded individual accounts  
(Brooks, 2002: 513-515). Similarly, Pinheiro (2004: pp. 112,134) argues that Brazil’s 
choice of an NDC-inspired reform rather than privatization in the late 1990s stemmed in 
large part from the latter’s high transition costs.  A shift to NDC is probably most likely 
to at least get on government's agenda where (1) a government faces severe fiscal 
pressure, and (2) a high debt/GDP ratio and/or current fiscal pressures inhibit a move to 
funded DC. 
Strong concerns about economic competitiveness sparked in particular by high 
payroll tax rates may also increase interest in NDC-based reforms. Higher capital tax 
rates are also severely constrained as a revenue source (Swank and Steinmo, 2002; 
Swank, 1998; Garrett, 1998). NDC-based reforms offer the opportunity to "lash policy to 
the mast" of a permanently fixed pension payroll tax, while the exact implications of that 
change for individual beneficiaries is made contingent on future economic and 
demographic developments. In general, we would expect countries that already have very 
high payroll tax rates along with the prospect of rapidly aging populations to be most   21
likely to consider NDC.  Countries without a pre-existing payroll tax structure, like New 
Zealand, would likely find the transition to NDC politically and administratively very 
difficult. The data in Table 4 suggest that consideration of NDC-based reforms is 
associated with countries with high or very high overall payroll tax rates. 
Overall, there does appear to be an association between strong demographic, 
fiscal and payroll tax rate pressures and NDC-based reforms reaching a country’s policy 
agenda.  But it is probably more accurate to say that economic-demographic pressures are 
helpful in explaining when pension reform generally gets on the agenda—in stimulating 
the “problem stream.”  While these pressures may have some impact on which policy 
responses are considered, they are insufficient to explain when NDC-based reforms rather 
than other types of restructuring reforms are seriously considered or are adopted. 
Ideational and International Forces 
A second very broad set of potential forces for pension reform are what can be 
called ideational and international forces. These forces are particularly likely to affect the 
“policy stream”—the range of options that are included in and excluded from serious 
policy debate. At least three types of forces are important to the flow of pension reform 
ideas. 
First, the “policy stream” is likely to be influenced by the strength of a domestic 
political base for conservative ideological critics of public Pay-As-You-Go pensions.  In 
general we would expect that proposals for pension privatization are  likely to dominate 
debates over pension restructuring in countries where (1) the overall ideological climate 
and (2) the  ideology of the governing political elites is suspicious of governmental action 
and has strong faith in market solutions to policy problems. NDC solutions, in contrast, 
are more likely to be on the agenda where pressures for pension restructuring are strong 
but the national (and governing political party/coalition) ideological climate is more   22
favorable to government and less favorable to privatization and individual accounts. 
Intermediate outcomes (e.g., greater or lesser roles for NDC and FDC in a multi-pillar 
system) may occur when forces are more evenly balanced in a political system. Such 
prolonged haggling can in fact be observed in negotiations between the Social Democrats 
and non-socialist parties over the relative sizes of the NDC and “premium pension” 
(individual account) tiers within the new Swedish pension system (Anderson and 
Weaver, forthcoming; Lundberg, 2003). 
In addition to domestic sources of pension reform ideas, the “policy stream” of 
reform agendas may also be “cued” from a second source: archetypal policy models or 
practices to which policymakers are exposed through informal regional networks of 
specialized policy elites (Bennett, 1991). Beyond the cognitive ease of looking to relevant 
examples, rather than “reinventing the wheel,” competitive and status concerns have 
entered prominently in the adoption of structural pension reforms in the past decade.
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Although advances in communication technology have virtually erased barriers to 
acquiring information about policies adopted on far corners of the world, policymakers 
tend to choose the countries from whom they borrow in systematic ways. Indeed, rather 
than examining policy changes from countries around the world, government technocrats 
tend to make use of “reference group” comparisons to narrow down the most relevant and 
desirable models for emulation (Dawson and Chatman, 2001). In particular, relevant or 
“peer” countries from which policy lessons are likely to be drawn are those (1) that share 
similar structural conditions and policy regimes, and therefore face similar problems in 
the short- and medium-term (2)  that share common demographic, economic or  political 
structures, and (3) those with which policy elites interact on a regular basis through 
regional organizations like the European Union and OECD, which actively promote 
policy diffusion – and harmonization – across member nations.    23
All of these factors suggest that at least initially, the dissemination of policy 
models is likely to be heavily regionalized—and available evidence confirms this 
hypothesis.  Several studies of pension privatization have shown that the likelihood of 
privatization is dramatically increased by the adoption of this policy change in peer 
nations (Brooks, 2003; Madrid, 2003) . Just as the Latin American nations looked more 
to the Chilean model than pension reformers in other regions, early adoption of the NDC 
system has been concentrated in Europe, with Italy, Poland, and Latvia among the early 
adopters.  Regional network effects in adoption of NDC reforms may weaken over time, 
however, as NDC ideas become fully diffused through professional networks of pension 
networks.   
A third source of ideas and pressures for specific courses of pension reform 
transcends regional networks: “supra-national” institutions such as the European Union 
(for member countries) as well as from international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Scholars have long attributed a central 
role to international organizations in shaping domestic policy processes around the world 
through the diffusion of norms and ideas (Keohane and Nye, 1974; Finnemore, 1993; 
Krasner, 1992; see also Nelson, 2004; Weyland, 2004).  
Supra-national institutions may influence country's pension policy choice in 
several distinct ways, however (Brooks, 2004). The first is through loan conditionality: a 
country may have to adopt certain reforms in order to get loan approval from the IMF, for 
example (Kahler, 1992). The second is through anticipated reaction: a country may adopt 
reforms that it thinks will win favorable action from the supra-national institution even 
without direct negotiations with, or explicit instruction from that institution.  Third, 
national policy elites may engage in a “two-level game,” utilizing perceived or alleged 
threats of negative actions by the supra-national institution to win support from reluctant   24
domestic actors and weaken veto points in order to take actions that they would like to 
take anyway (Putnam, 1988; Moravsik, 1993). Fourth, supra-national institutions may act 
simply as agents of knowledge transfer for "best practices" from other countries. A fifth 
potential channel is what can be called harmonization, where a supra-national institution 
tries to get member countries to develop common practices to lower regulatory barriers to 
labor and capital mobility. Overall, we would expect that (1) some form of structural 
pension reform is more likely to get on the agenda when a supra-national institution sets 
deficit and debt reduction targets for participation its programs, (2) that NDC in particular 
is more likely to get on a government's agenda when a government participates in 
institution-sponsored networks where NDC ideas are active, and (3) that governments are 
more likely to adopt an NDC-based reform when they anticipate that a shift to NDC will 
aid them in obtaining loan approval or another desired outcome from the institution.  
Several of these channels can be seen in the pension austerity measures taken in 
European Union member countries. Perhaps most important, in countries such as Italy, 
pension retrenchment was seen as necessary to meet the three percent of GDP target set 
for government deficit as a condition for entry into the European Monetary Union 
(Schludi, 2002). However, these actions by national policymakers largely took the form 
of “anticipated reactions” and strategic choices designed to win the acquiescence of 
domestic opponents of painful pension reforms.  The EU has also set other requirements 
(e.g., requiring gender neutrality in retirement ages) that have an impact on austerity 
policy choices and led indirectly to modest policy harmonization. Moreover, the EU has 
not even attempted to harmonize most aspects of the disparate pension systems of its 
member countries, and where it has tried to harmonize policies directly, notably in the 
area of supplemental pensions, it has had little success. While some analysts have argued 
that NDC-based reforms could serve as a vehicle for pension harmonization in the   25
European Union (Holzmann, 2003), the European Commission itself has not endorsed 
such an approach. The absence of harmonization pressure within the EU helps to explain 
the absence of overall policy convergence on NDC or any other single model for pension 
restructuring in Western Europe.  
A second “supra-national” force, international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank, have played a more important role than the EU in bringing the question of 
structural pension reform to the top of political agendas around the world, particarly 
among the transitional and developing countries who are their clients.  Governments in 
developing and transitional countries face tight resource constraints for autonomous 
research and development of policy models, while advanced industrial nations typically 
possess expansive bureaucracies with strong technical and intellectual ties to research 
communities, as well as a more extensive experience with research and modeling of 
market-oriented economic policies.  
Few institutions have rivaled the global influence of the World Bank in the 
dissemination of the ideas and technology of multi-pillared pension reform.  The World 
Bank’s 1994 report Averting the Old Age Crisis brought unprecedented international 
attention to the issue of old age pension reform, fundamentally transforming the way that 
policymakers conceptualized the issues and solutions to the challenges of old age income 
reform.  More concretely, the World Bank, along with other international financial 
institutions that promoted market-oriented reform in the developing world, provided the 
resources, technology, political support (or pressures) and secondary financial incentives 
for governments to adopt some form of privately-managed funded pension schemes 
(Mosely, Harrigan and Toye, 1991).  
While there is little evidence to suggest that the instrument of loan conditionality 
has been the primary means through which international financial institutions have   26
promoted social policy changes, there is little doubt that the World Bank played a 
powerful role in promoting the adoption of structural DC pension reforms by enhancing 
the attraction of government technocrat to these policy designs.  Through active 
dissemination of ideas associating the shift from DB to DC (both financial and notional) 
structures to an array of micro and macroeconomic benefits, World Bank actors 
generated strong attraction to DC pension reforms among Finance Ministry and Central 
Bank  policy makers in disparate corners of the world.
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While other international institutions, such as the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and International Social Security Association (ISSA) disseminated 
competing ideas to those of the World Bank, the latter enjoyed important resource 
advantages over the ILO and ISSA, dedicating vastly greater human and financial 
resources to the research and dissemination of ideas and policy models based on the DC 
mechanisms (Orenstein, 2003). Indeed, following the publication of its 1994 report, the 
World Bank social protection group launched a multi-year dissemination project, holding 
workshops and training seminars around the world.  It likewise fostered cross-national 
policy sharing through  a series of annual summer workshops organized by the World 
Bank’s Economic Development Institute (now the World Bank Institute, WBI) in 
conjunction with the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID).  The EDI-
HIID (now, the WBI-Kennedy School) summer program became a clearinghouse for 
pension reform ideas, bringing together academics, social security experts and 
policymakers from around the world to build connections and share ideas about pension 
reform. These seminars allowed policymakers to transcend their regional policy networks 
and examine reform practices of disparate nations from which they would be otherwise 
unlikely to borrow policy cues.  Moreover, the World Bank has in recent years promoted 
the discussion of a wide range of pension reform models—and in particular NDC-based   27
reforms￿rather than a single focus on FDC schemes. Indeed, the participation of  social 
security experts from Sweden  in these summer workshops opened up the NDC reform 
ideas to policymakers from far outside the original networks through which these ideas 
were carried in Europe. Exposure of Brazilian technocrats to the NDC model at the 1998 
workshop became a pivotal influence on Brazil’s 1999 notional account pension reform 
(Pinheiro, 2004: pp. 130-31).  In Uruguay as well, the IDB played a more important role 
in transferring ideas and technology of pension reform than in promoting any specific 
policy model.  The research that led up to the (eventually rejected) 1992 NDC reform 
proposal in Uruguay was financed by a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank, 
and was based on technical advice from a team of Latin American pension experts, 
including a Brazilian scholar who later participated in the design of the 1999 quasi-
notional DC pension reform in Brazil. Reformers in Uruguay maintain that no specific 
conditions were attached with regard to adoption of a specific policy model. 
 Of the possible means through which IFIs can influence domestic policy adoption 
– conditionality, anticipated reaction, "two-level games" and knowledge transfer – the 
last appears to be the most important. The predominant role of supra-national institutions 
in influencing NDC and other pension reforms appears to be in the agenda-setting “policy 
stream”￿ transmission of policy ideas and reform models through technocratic 
networks￿rather than determining whether or not they adopt them. 
 
Policy Feedbacks 
Once in place, public pension systems have a profound effect on subsequent 
battles over pension reform.  The existing pension system defines not only the winners 
and losers of structural reform initiatives, it also delimits the range and intensity of issues 
over which beneficiaries of the status quo will fight.  The structure and performance of   28
the old pension system affects several important aspects of  policy choice, including 
public expectations as to the ‘proper’ role of the government and the ‘fair’ level of 
redistribution in social security; the magnitude of vested interests in the status quo – who 
stands to gain and lose and how much; and the cost structure and implicit pension debt 
associated with the current policy as well as the transitional cost of moving from an 
unfunded to a funded system. In short, policy feedbacks affect all three agenda-setting 
“streams,” making pension regime change heavily “path dependent” (Pierson, 1994, 
2000). Three policy parameters seem prima facie likely to be conducive to both 
consideration and adoption of an NDC-based pension reform: (1) a strong earnings-
related component to the pension system; (2) high implicit pension debt associated with 
generous replacement rates in a DB scheme, and (3) the existence of complete payroll tax 
records that allow compilation of lifetime earnings records for calculating benefits under 
an NDC scheme. 
First, NDC reforms are more likely where the existing system employs an 
earnings-related benefit structure (as in a Bismarckian social insurance model), because 
such a regime encourages public perceptions that a ‘fair’ pension scheme should allow 
benefits to bear some relation to contributions,. If  the contribution-benefit linkage is 
widely perceived to work poorly (e.g., by delivering benefits in a distorted or unfair 
fashion), however, or public confidence in the capacity of the DB system to pay benefits 
in the near- and medium-term has been very badly shaken, public support for tightening 
the link between benefits and contributions may be more easily cultivated. 
 The structure of the old pension system also creates important financial 
constraints on reform options. As noted above, if payroll taxes are already high to finance 
a public DB scheme, market pressures to increase flexibility and lower non-wage costs 
leave little room to increase contributions to social security.  Adding to the constraints of   29
high payroll taxes and well-organized constituents is the heavy implicit pension debt 
associated with high replacement rates in most traditional DB pension schemes.  A large 
implicit pension debt makes the transition cost of a shift toward pre-funding (for 
example, by diverting payroll contributions to individual accounts) very high. This 
transitional cost can in theory be financed through increased taxes, spending cuts, or by 
issuing new debt, but political and financial constraints may place these options out of 
reach for many governments. 
In "Bismarckian" countries with a very large public earnings-related pension tier, 
pressures to reduce pension costs and reduce rather than just stabilizing pension 
contribution rates have been especially severe. Bismarckian countries are likely to begin 
with incremental retrenchment and refinancing measures, but as these have been 
exhausted, several have turned toward more fundamental restructuring reforms to reduce 
current and future costs. Because the public Pay-As-You-Go tier was already so large, 
however, proposals for a mandatory occupational or personal pension individual account 
tier had to adapt or be "crowded out" by the double payment problem.  When expanded 
mandatory or quasi-mandatory individual account tiers have been adopted in these 
countries, notably in Sweden and Germany, it has been as a relatively small supplement 
to a still very large public pension tier that faced severe affordability problems.  As Table 
4 suggests, NDC-focused pension reforms initially emerged in countries like Sweden and 
Italy that offered generous "Bismarckian" pensions, for it is in these countries that current 
and future pension funding problems were most severe, and where the double payment 
problem made a DC-based alternative less feasible.  In what can be called "Bismarckian 
Lite" countries, Canada and the United States, pension replacement rates and financing 
burdens are relatively modest. These countries are likely to be able to maintain their   30
current pension structures with incremental measures for some years into the future, and 
NDC-based reforms have not reached the agenda.  
A third policy feedback that might be expected to make consideration and 
adoption of NDC-based reforms more likely is the existence of complete payroll records 
that allow retrospective calculation of lifetime earnings to establish NDC “account 
balances.” In practice, however, this does not appear to be the case.  Countries that do not 
have adequate retrospective wage records have developed alternative mechanisms to 
credit initial capital in NDC accounts (Palmer, 2003;  Chlon-Dominczak and Gora, 2003; 
Pinheiro, 2004, p. 131). 
 
Political System Characteristics 
Specific characteristics of national political environments may also affect both the 
agenda-setting political stream￿whether a particular reform idea develops an 
institutional carrier that perceives political and policy advantages to a specific pension 
reform proposal￿and prospects for adoption once that proposal is on the agenda .  
Understanding the development and diffusion of NDC-based pension reforms 
must begin with a recognition of  the opportunities and costs that it imposes for key 
actors in society.  Within government, two key sets of actors are likely to be involved in 
pension reform politics in most countries: elected politicians and Finance Ministries (or 
their equivalent ministries charged with budgetary and overall economic management).  
Elected politicians are driven powerfully by the desire to avoid blame for costly 
policy adjustments (Pierson and Weaver, 1993). Altering public pension systems is 
especially risky because losses are perceived as particularly salient by the target group 
and because in many countries, the elderly are disproportionately likely to vote. For state 
leaders pressed by demographic and economic change to diminish long-term state   31
pension liabilities, NDC reforms represent a possible means to reduce pension 
expenditures and commitments while avoiding blame for doing so. In the short term, 
citizens (and politicians) who are unfamiliar with actuarial principles may be confounded 
by the NDC scheme.  The contingency of future pension benefits on demographic and 
economic trends also makes it difficult for citizens to predict ex ante the precise material 
implication of NDC shifts. Whether it is likely that this uncertainty will limit initial 
opposition to NDC, it could potentially foster exaggerated fears that increase opposition 
to a shift to NDC.  
In the longer term, NDC schemes releases politicians from responsibility for 
benefit reductions as demographic and economic profiles change. By adjusting benefits 
automatically to life expectancy, not only do governments avoid the need to make such 
changes, but they can escape responsibility for the benefit reductions triggered by the 
demographic and economic trends, since these lay beyond the immediate command of 
government. NDC reform thus offers the appeal as a meaningful structural reform from 
which politicians can walk away with “clean hands.”  However, the reluctance of 
politicians to make unpopular adjustments to the parameters of pension systems may 
raise the longer-term risk that the cost of increasing longevity will be borne excessively 
in the value of pension benefits, which may erode pensions below a socially-accepted 
level.
 12 Thus the political advantages of NDC reforms in allowing politicians to avoid 
blame for costly benefit reductions also give rise to a longer-term social cost if old age 
pensions fail to provide sufficient protection against the risk of poverty in aging societies. 
Finance ministry officials have likewise played an important role in the adoption 
of structural pension reforms. Their attitude toward, and activism in promoting, NDC-
based pension reforms is likely to be conditioned by several factors. First, the importance 
of Finance Ministries is enhanced where fiscal pressures have been a primary motivator   32
for pension reforms, and in countries facing strong international financial constraints, 
either from foreign investors, international financial institutions, or supra-national 
organizations such as the European Union.  In Poland, for example, Góra and Rutkowski 
(2000) argue that Finance ministry officials’ demands for macroeconomic discipline in 
1991 became an important force moving the country toward structural pension reform. 
NDC reforms thus become attractive to Finance Ministry officials to the extent that 
budgetary pressures from unfunded DB schemes collide with medium-term constraints on 
government’s ability to finance a private funded-DC reform. In Brazil, for example, 
although Finance Ministry officials favored a structural pension reform in early 1999,  
Central Bank officials vetoed a mixed DB and funded-DC pension reform on account of 
the effect of such a reform’s transition cost on short-term macroeconomic performance, 
which had come under intense international pressure following a currency crisis.   
However, the attitude of Finance Ministry official toward NDC pension reform 
may also be heavily influenced by the overall design of the pension reform package: if, 
for example, the tighter linkage between contributions and benefits is accompanied by a 
requirement that greatly increased general government revenues be used for non-
employment credits (e.g., for care-giving) and for an expanded non-contributory pensions 
for low-earners, then such officials are likely to balk. 
Political institutions may also affect the prospects for adoption of NDC proposals 
once they are on the agenda. First, a substantial literature suggests that multiple veto 
points in the policy adoption process  can lower both the probability of any change from 
the policy status quo (see Immergut, 1992; Tsebelis, 1999) and the scope of any change 
that is adopted.
13 In his study of pension privatization in Latin America, Raúl Madrid 
(2003, p. 203) suggests that the second effect is more important than the first: 
authoritarian regimes are no more likely than democratic regimes to privatize (because   33
they are no more likely to decide to privatize in the first place), but the proposals it enacts 
are “much less likely to get watered down in the legislature in authoritarian regimes than 
in democratic regimes.” The passage of significant pension reforms should be particularly 
difficult in countries with large, multi-party governments where government leaders need 
to build majorities across parties occupying a broad range of ideological positions.
14  
In practice, however, there does not appear to be a strong association between 
concentrated executive authority and adoption of NDC-based reforms. Indeed, Sweden, 
Latvia, Poland, Italy and Brazil are all proportional representation systems in which a 
large number of parties held seats in the legislature at the time that an NDC or NDC-
oriented reform was passed.
15 In each of these countries, such reforms were adopted 
following intense negotiations across a diverse set of parties.  Beyond the compromises 
embodied within the structure of the NDC scheme, each country also combined distinct 
pillars of the social security system in such a way that satisfied demands of diverse 
coalition partners and organized interests, while working within the financial and political 
constraints of the old pension system. This evidence suggests that the strength or 
weakness of multiple veto points in the formal structures of government may be less 
important than the availability of a variety of ad hoc mechanisms that can overcome these 
potential stumbling blocks by acting as functional substitutes for concentrated power.  
Such mechanisms range from technocratic governments with decree powers in Italy to 
informal cross-party agreements in Germany and formal multi-party working groups in 
Sweden (Schludi, 2002, chapter 9).  Clearly the availability of a multi-party working 
group--which in turn reflected a longer history of cross-party political cooperation--was 
very important in facilitating the Swedish NDC reform. On the other hand, inability to 
work across parties has clearly paralyzed Social Security reforms in the United States in 
the post-1983 period.   34
 
Policy Design 
The discussion to this point has emphasized structural features of pension systems 
and political and social institutions as an explanation of whether NDC-based pension 
reforms reach the agenda and win adoption.  But the chances of success in adopting 
reform may also depend on the exact provisions of an NDC reform package—notably 
who is covered by it, how quickly it is phased in, which groups are afforded special 
protections, and how much protection is provided by other pension tiers. For example, 
seniors’ organizations are more likely to oppose a shift to NDC the faster it is phased in, 
because that will have a greater impact on their current membership. It is no accident that 
pension reform initiatives of all kinds generally “grandfather” current retirees and 
provide generous transition rules protecting older workers from most cutbacks. 
NDC schemes offer reforming governments–especially those in fragmented, 
multi-party political systems–a way to resolve the diverse objectives of coalition partners 
from opposing ends of the ideological spectrum, and thus may facilitate the creation of 
legislative majorities behind this significant structural reform.  For governments pressed 
by demographic and economic changes to reduce long-term state pension liabilities (in an 
unfunded DB pension system), the tighter link between contributions and benefits in the 
DC mechanism presents a key means to achieve this objective. Yet, unlike funded-DC 
schemes, the creation of a large NDC component to mandatory pension systems will not 
alienate parties that are either skeptical about the privately-managed pension schemes, or 
view a central role for the state in the pension system as the sine qua non of social 
security.  By retaining the pay-as-you-go financing structure, and moreover by permitting 
legislative control over the notional interest rate, NDC reforms may conciliate the 
demands of parties seeking to protect bureaucratic jobs and the central role for the state in   35
the collection and allocation of benefits.  Moreover, the aspects of NDC reforms that 
permit the government either to deliver privileges to constituencies such as the uniformed 
services, or to reward socially-valued activities such as child-rearing, higher education or 
military service, provides a variety of bargaining tools with which the government can 
propitiate interest groups or parties that oppose the NDC reform. If reformers are able to 
tailor NDC-inspired reforms to fit local policy, political and social conditions, they may 
be able to move their countries from non-adoption to at least partial adoption of NDC 
reforms. 
 
Evaluating Determinants and Explaining Patterns of Reform 
  The diffusion of NDC-based pension reform is clearly a complex, multi-causal 
process.  Even the long list of potential influences on adoption or rejection of NDC 
reform outlined in Table 3 does not exhaust the list of plausible causal variables 
influencing the spread of NDC-based reforms.
16 Moreover, the patterns shown in Table 4 
do not reveal simple one-to-one relationships between specific independent variables and 
particular outcomes: causal effects are more aptly characterized as probabilistic and 
interactive rather than as individually necessary or sufficient. 
  Sweden’s role as NDC innovator illustrates these patterns. Sweden’s serious 
aging problem as well as a financial crisis and resistance to higher payroll taxes helped 
put pension reform on the Swedish agenda in the early 1990s, as similar 
economic/demographic constraints did in many other countries. High technocratic 
capacity  and a fairly even balance (and change in control of government) between Social 
Democratic and non-socialist forces, as well as the more idiosyncratic factors of a strong 
technocratic orientation in the working group planning the pension reform and the 
exclusion of “social partners” from a direct role in negotiations (Lundberg, 2003,   36
Lindbom, 2001; Anderson and Weaver, forthcoming) all help to explain why Sweden 
was the first to declare to adopt framework legislation for NDC-based reform.  But 
Sweden’s relatively open political system, and in particular, grassroots opposition within 
Sweden’s powerful blue-collar labor confederation and the Social Democratic party 
explain why it took another four years for final legislation to be adopted rather than 
winning quick adoption. 
  Clearly both regional networks and supra-national institutions were important in 
explaining the diffusion of NDC-based reforms beyond its origins in Sweden to other 
relatively early innovators like Latvia and Poland. Both Swedish experts and the World 
Bank played particularly important roles in spreading these ideas. But as Orenstein 
(2003: 174) suggests, theories that focus on the diffusion of ideas through regional 
networks are not very helpful in understanding when, where and how NDC-based 
reforms will be altered to fit local conditions by lengthening transition periods, excluding 
specific groups from the reform, or deciding on the relative size of an NDC-based tier 
within a multi-pillar pension system.  To answer these questions, approaches that focus 
on policy feedbacks, societal interests and political conditions are needed. 
  Policy feedbacks play a particularly important role in advanced industrial 
countries. Among these countries, NDC-based reforms have spread primarily among 
countries where “Bismarckian” social insurance principles of earnings replacement in the 
public pension system are deeply ingrained rather than those where a flat-rate system 
(New Zealand) or a mixed public-private system (the United Kingdom, Switzerland) is in 
place.  Younger and less generous “Bismarckian Lite” countries (the United States and 
Canada) are also less likely to see NDC-based reforms on the agenda.   
  Policy feedback effects are less clear in the developing and transitional economies 
of Central and Eastern Europe, however, where NDC based reforms have been enacted   37
even in the absence of adequate wage records and a strongly earnings-related precursor 
system.  In these countries, regional and supra-national influences appear to be more 
important.  And in Africa and East Asia where public pension coverage rates are 
generally much lower, NDC-based reforms have barely made a ripple.  These patterns of 
regionally uneven policy feedback effects are likely to change over time: as NDC-based 
reforms become fully diffused over the next decade or so among pension policy experts 
world-wide, regional network and supra-national institution effects in adoption of NDC-
based reform may weaken in the developing and transitional economies. 
   
III. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES 
 
Adopting notional defined contribution-based pension reforms can be an 
important mechanism for restraining pension costs and generating a closer link between 
individuals’ contributions and benefits.  But adoption of reform is only half of the battle.  
As Eric Patashnik (2003) has shown, major policy reforms are subject to erosion or 
reversal once they are enacted. Developing constituencies who have a stake in the new 
policy  is particularly important to sustaining policy innovation. 
In the case of NDC-based pension reforms, erosion is probably a greater concern 
than outright reversal. Indeed, erosion of NDC-based reforms may be attractive to 
governments because it offers short-term political gains (or avoids short-term political 
costs) while the effects of those actions on the sustainability of the system may not be 
immediately obvious.  As Table 5 suggests, this erosion could occur in any of the key 
attributes that define an NDC-based pension system.  For example, governments might 
choose to impute contributions that have not actually been made, either for all 
contributors (as in Italy) or for certain groups (e.g., caregivers, university students).   In 
countries where the government has chosen to finance all non-actuarial benefits (e.g., for   38
caregivers) from the general budget, there may be a tendency to simply impute those 
credits during periods of fiscal stress. Statistical agencies could also be pressured not to 
make projections that trigger politically unpopular benefit changes —e.g., projections of 
increased longevity or long-term economic growth.  While this may not be a problem in 
countries where statistical agencies are well-established, highly professionalized, and 
enjoy a high degree of independence, status and deference, it could certainly be a 
problem in some developing and transitional economies where none of these things are 
true. Governments may also be tempted to use NDC contributions to pay some of the 
costs to pay for pension tiers outside the NDC system that maintain benefit adequacy for 
selected segments of the elderly population as NDC is phased in rather than using them to 
build a buffer fund. 
Because NDC systems are not completely different from existing DB pensions, 
but there are in fact "partial" NDC positions (as shown in the fourth column in Table 1), 
the big challenge of policymakers in NDC systems is likely to be to hold the line against 
reforms that move from NDC provisions to middle positions (e.g., retaining brakes, but 
with a cap; temporary increases in contribution rates; infusions of general revenue to 
keep real benefits from falling; imputing contributions that are purely notional rather than 
real, as in Sweden; moving from universal coverage of NDC to exclusion of privileged 
categories of workers).  The 1995 Latvian pension reform, for example, went into effect 
immediately, reducing benefits for a significant portion of workers retiring in 1996, while 
generating vast disparities in pension benefits.
17 When benefits under the new scheme 
proved very different from public expectations, a loud and forceful public outcry placed 
intense pressure on politicians to revisit the pension reform law in October 1997 and 
March 1998, when a series of measures were adopted that enhanced the generosity of 
benefits and reinstated some degree of redistribution to the system that was removed in   39
the NDC reform. Together, these changes raised the real value of the average pension by 
15% (Fox and Palmer, 1999:18).  In Poland, changes made in 1999 moved new hires in 
the uniformed services out of the NDC pension system back into a more generous DB 
system enjoyed by current employees in the uniformed services 
Several factors may lead to the erosion of NDC-based pension reforms. Most 
generally, the political party or coalition that instituted the reform may lose power to 
another political grouping that is hostile to the reform—that may indeed have used 
opposition to the reform as a key plank in their electoral campaign. Table 5 suggests 
several conditions that may also lead to the erosion of specific components of an NDC-
based reform.  A government fiscal crisis, for example, is particularly likely to erode a 
government’s commitment to make actual contributions in recognition of non-
employment activities (e.g., child-care years and unemployment spells).  A short-term 
cash flow crunch as a result of a demographic “bulge” may tempt governments to raise 
payroll taxes rather than injecting general revenues even though doing so increases the 
long-term liabilities of the system. Unrest among the military or a strike threat from 
public transit workers may lead to their return to a more generous DB system. A decline 
in the overall labor force and wage bill may leave a government unwilling to cut annuity 
benefits for retirees and account balances for current workers.  In short, like decisions on 
adopting a public pension system, both economic/demographic factors and societal 
factors are likely to affect final outcomes. 
 Having an NDC-based system in place does shift the bargaining leverage in favor 
of those who want to put greater financial discipline in the pension system, because it 
requires them merely to block changes rather than enact them.  This advantage is likely to 
be important in political systems (a) where the governing party or coalition has sufficient 
agenda control to keep reform-eroding proposals off the agenda , and (b) with multiple   40
veto points, where super-majorities are usually needed to move from the default position. 
But where agenda control is weak and where veto points are fewer and weaker, 
temptations for politicians to loosen the lashes will remain strong. 
The most essential element to sustaining a complete NDC model once it has been 
adopted is likely to be the maintenance of a broad multi-party agreement in government 
that NDC is the right thing to do, and broad public understanding of, and support for the 
reform.  So far, this agreement within the government appears to be holding in Sweden, 
the home of the NDC idea. However, public opinion surveys suggest that even after 
several years of multi-media public information campaigns, most citizens lack basic 
knowledge of the fundamental precepts (and even the name) of the NDC scheme (Sundén 
(2003). As Sundén (2003: 15) argues, because DC systems make it difficult for 
individuals to anticipate their retirement benefits, it is important for citizens to have a 
strong understanding of how benefits are determined under the new system, and how this 
has changed from the former DB scheme, if they are to make informed decisions on how 
much to work and save. From a political standpoint, moreover, improving public 
information about NDC reforms, and their implications for long-term benefits may be a 
crucial factor in avoiding the backlash experienced in Latvia in 1996 when pension 
benefits diverged radically from public expectations. 
Whether Swedish experience of broad political consensus sustaining an NDC-
based pension system can be repeated in countries where traditions of inter-party 
cooperation are weaker, trade unions are less cooperative, and politicians have stronger 
incentives to respond to independently organized groups of seniors, remains to be seen. 
While the public information campaign carried out by the Social Insurance Board in 
Sweden likewise represents a model for many countries, evidence that a majority of 
Swedes lack basic knowledge of the pension system, and that a majority also perceive   41
that they have significant information needs, should serve as an important warning to 
politicians as to the risk of public backlash in the future if citizens over-estimate their old 
age income protection and fail to save adequately.  Moreover, if such information 
problems exist in small, affluent and highly educated nations such as Sweden, successful 
public information campaigns will likely be even more difficult in the developing and 
transitional countries. 
 
IV.PROSPECTS AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
Notional defined contribution pension reforms are likely to be an important part 
of pension reformers’ “toolkits” in the years ahead.  For technocrats, NDC packages 
combine conceptual elegance and the promise of fiscal discipline that is seen to be 
lacking in most DB pension plans. For politicians, NDC plans combine an aura of 
fairness (in relating contributions to benefits) that can be explained to voters with the 
prospect that they will in the future be spared from dealing with politically painful benefit 
cutbacks and payroll tax increases.  The “automaticity” of NDC is likely to give it 
continuing appeal to blame-avoiding politicians, especially in countries with social 
insurance- based systems and moderate debt/GDP ratios, as well as to international 
financial institutions seeking to promote sustainable fiscal policies. 
Indeed, a political analysis of NDC-based reforms suggests that there is a central 
contradiction in the political appeal of NDC-based reforms: technocrats are attracted to 
NDC because in its “complete” form it  sends clear signals to workers on the need to 
work longer and the  need to save for retirement in order to obtain an adequate pension.  
The problem, however, is that transparency on these issues may kill prospects for NDC-
based reform, since workers are likely to object to making these changes, especially older 
workers who have limited time to adjust and blue-collar workers for whom working   42
longer may be more difficult or even impossible.  Politicians, on the other hand, are likely 
to be attracted to NDC for precisely the opposite reason: it can hide the magnitude of 
future recipient losses vis-à-vis the policy status quo because 1) NDC benefit 
determinations are opaque to most recipients and (2) future cutbacks are contingent on 
future economic and demographic developments.  There are strong incentives for 
politicians not to be clear about the likely effects of an NDC-based reform on individual 
workers if they hope to succeed in adopting and sustaining that reform.  But this in turn 
may undercut many of the hoped-for effects of NDC-based reforms on retirement and 
savings behavior, and the political sustainability of the NDC reform itself. 
Overall, the analysis in this paper suggests that NDC is no panacea.  Five issues in 
particular are important in considering the prospects for NDC-based reforms. First, there 
are limitations to the applicability of NDC systems.  For countries that do not have the 
administrative capacity to collect and maintain adequate contribution records on a 
consistent basis, NDC systems are not workable.  At a minimum, the phase-in period in 
such countries will have to be very long to develop such a capacity.  Moreover, in 
countries where public pensions have not historically had a close linkage to earnings 
(e.g., countries with a flat-rate pension), a shift to an NDC is likely to impose substantial 
losses for some recipients.  Again, a long lead time is likely to be necessary to lessen 
political opposition to such a shift. 
Second, there is a danger that adoptions of incomplete and flawed NDC pension 
plans, as in Italy, may lull politicians into a false sense of complacency that they have 
“solved” their long-term pension problems when they have not. As both  politicians and 
constituencies become more familiar with the dynamics of NDC pensions, the probability 
grows rather than shrinks that compromises will be built into reform packages that 
undercut their effectiveness and sustainability.  Like a photocopy of a photocopy of a   43
photocopy that still bears the original image in a perceptible but fuzzy way, future NDC 
pension regimes in some countries may be called NDC, and have many of their elements, 
but lack fiscal and political sustainability. 
Third, adoption of NDC-based pension reforms are no panacea for providing 
political cover for long-term pension retrenchment. It still requires that politicians refrain 
from the politically easy course of demanding more generous pension benefits for visible 
groups of constituents, and that they refrain from going along when other politicians 
make those demands. It also requires that politicians refrain from political interference 
with “buffer funds” where they exist.   There is no such thing as a “politician-proof 
reform”--pension or otherwise--but there are more political risk-resistant political 
institutions and policy structures. 
While the novelty of NDC schemes and the contingency of future benefits on 
economic and demographic factors affords politicians a unique opportunity to  rationalize 
state pensions without confronting strong opposition ex ante, these factors also enhance 
the need for effective political management of information and guidance of public 
expectations as to the value of future pension benefits.  The Swedish strategy of 
providing workers with annual statements showing the evolution of notional account 
balances is emblematic of good public information and expectations management.   
Campaigns such as these diminish the risk that the government will face a political 
backlash if benefits under the NDC scheme diverge widely from public expectations. 
A fourth potential shortcoming of NDC-based pension reform flows directly from 
the periodic information about balances in individual notional accounts that in theory 
should be provided to participants in an NDC system.  As Daniele Franco pointed out in 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper: when NDC is enacted in a flawed or 
incomplete manor that is likely to require further changes in the future, this information   44
can in fact make those further reforms politically much more difficult. Notional account 
balance statements give workers a much greater sense of “property rights” in the balances 
in those accounts by making them much more visible.  If a future reform, for example, 
eliminated pension rights for contributions that were credited but not actually made, the 
balances in the accounts would shrink.  A major public uproar would likely result over 
politicians “stealing” their money—a politician’s worst nightmare.  Similarly, if expected 
increases in longevity are not included in statements regularly, it could lead to sudden 
drops in the benefit flow expected from account balances when they are included.  Such 
changes will lead both to a decline in confidence in the pension system and to political 
problems for politicians.   
Finally, while the stabilization of contribution rates remains an important concern, 
it should be emphasized that NDC pension systems transfer significant new risks to 
individuals, notably the risk of lower benefits due to poor macro-economic performance 
and the risk of being able to find appropriate (or any) work at an advanced age if workers 
are expected to stay in employment longer to maintain a replacement rate similar to that 
enjoyed by current retirees (Scherman, 2003). The risk of poverty in old age remains a 
significant policy risk, especially in many developing and transitional nations, and is 
likely to increase under NDC-based systems. Governments need to balance the goals of 
stabilizing or reducing payroll taxes with other political and social objectives in designing 
overall pension reforms.  For instance, the authors of the Latvia Human Development 
Report 2000/2001 observe that “[t]he average Latvian pension still remains considerably 
below the value of the minimum goods and services basket, although the difference 
between these two indicators is steadily diminishing” (Bite and Zagorskis, 2003:63). 
Despite the increase in pension values, cost-saving measures passed in 1999 were 
expected to significantly decrease pension values in 2000 and 2001, more than half of   45
which were already at the minimum value (Bite and Zagorskis, 2003:64).  In  Latin 
America as well, given that a large portion of pensions granted are at the minimum level, 
efforts to control costs through benefit reduction alone should take into consideration 
issues of adequacy and poverty reduction when considering how to accommodate 
demographic change.  In these cases, raising the retirement age and promoting higher 
individual savings offer alternative means to assure the financial stability of public 
pension schemes. 
Increasing the linkage between pension contributions and benefits will also almost 
certainly require supplementation of NDC benefits with “social pensions” if they are to 
provide adequate minimum benefits.  This is true in both rich and poor countries, but it is 
especially true in LDC and transitional economies.  Social pensions complementing an 
NDC-based tier can be structured in several ways: as a universal pension received by all, 
or as a pension that is tested against income, income and assets, or (as in Sweden), only 
against other pension income.  It can also be financed in a variety of ways, notably 
through a separate payroll tax or general revenues. 
Our overall conclusion is thus unsurprising but critical: NDC-based reforms are 
likely to work best in countries that have the political capacity to achieve and sustain a 
broad political agreement and the administrative capacity to produce independent 
forecasts of economic and demographic trends and complete and accurate records of 
earnings, as well as ensuring compliance and adequate understanding on the part of 
employers and employees. They are less likely to work well where those capacities are 
lacking.  NDC should not, therefore, be thought of as a simple way to avoid the political 
dilemmas of pension politics by securely lashing politicians to the mast of an 
automatically adjusting pension system.  Neither the mast nor the lashings are that strong,   46
and the sirens’ call remains very powerful in many countries. Moreover, NDC-based 
pensions result in an important transfer of risks to individuals.  
Thus while NDC-based reforms can be an important part of the pension reform 
repertoire for both domestically- based politicians and expert groups and for trans-
national actors (including international financial institutions), there is no substitute for a 
careful analysis of a country’s political and social environment and administrative 
capacity to determine how such a reform is likely to work on the ground.  NDC at best is 
likely to be the least undesirable of many imperfect alternatives in achieving pension 
reforms that balance fiscal sustainability, adequacy and fairness within and across 
generations.  47
Table 1. NDC Pension Provisions as a Continuum 
 
Provision  Defined Benefit  Middle Position DB 
Reforms 
“Weak” or "Partial" 
NDC 
“Strong” or “Full” 
NDC 
Structural 
Features 
       
Advanced 
Funding 
Pay-As-You-Go  Pay-As-You-Go with 
some advanced 
funding 
  PAYG with inclusion 
of buffer funds in 
benefit calculations 
Life 
Expectancy at 
retirement 
No provision in 
benefit calculation  
Inclusion of 
“demographic factor” 
in benefit calculation 
to fully or partially 
compensate for 
population aging 
Periodic or incomplete 
(e.g., exclusion of 
post-retirement) 
increases in longevity 
Future benefit levels 
adjust automatically 
for increases in 
longevity 
Retirement 
age 
Fixed standard 
retirement age (may 
include actuarial 
adjustments for 
earlier or later 
retirement; may be 
ad hoc increases in 
retirement age 
Flexible retirement 
age and/or automatic 
increases in retirement 
age to fully or partially 
compensate for 
longevity increases 
  No standard retirement 
age with full actuarial 
adjustment for earlier 
or later and partial 
retirement 
Inflation and 
economic 
growth 
Benefits adjusted for 
inflation and/or 
earnings increases 
Brakes for poor 
economic performance 
and high inflation 
Incomplete brakes for 
poor economic growth 
and high inflation 
Benefits tied fully to 
economic growth 
Payroll tax 
rate 
Payroll tax adjusts 
to needs of PAYG 
system on ad hoc 
basis; may include 
general revenues 
Fixed “in theory” at 
maximum target level 
(e.g., below 10% in 
Canada, 20% in 
Germany) but may be 
revised in practice 
Fixed payroll tax rate 
includes some 
redistributive elements 
(e.g., flat-rate tier) or 
is credited at a higher 
rate than actually 
contributed 
Fixed payroll tax rate 
Redistribution 
across 
generations 
Present, usually with 
first generations 
benefiting in 
“Ponzi” fashion 
May be restricted 
within DB tiers by 
lowering replacement 
rates and tying 
contribution rates to  
level needed to be 
self-sustaining over 
long-term  
Credits given to some 
cohorts for which no 
contributions were 
made 
Barred within NDC 
tier  
Redistribution 
within 
generations 
Permitted  within 
DB tier, based on 
limited number of 
“high years” on 
which benefits are 
based, higher 
replacement rates 
for low-earners, 
credits given for 
which no 
contributions have 
been made  
May be restricted 
within DB tiers by 
increasing number of 
years on which 
benefits are replaced, 
eliminating or 
reducing replacement 
rate differentials and 
limiting credits for 
non-wage activity 
Some credits given for 
activities for which no 
contributions were 
made 
Barred within NDC 
tier unless financed by 
payments from 
government or others 
with respect to non-
employment activity. 
Exception: NDC 
implicitly redistributes 
from men to women 
and other population 
sub-groups with 
longer life-expectancy 
if single annuitization 
table is used   48
 
Coverage  No NDC coverage    Only some sectors 
(e.g., private sector) 
are covered by NDC 
system 
All workers in 
specified age cohorts 
are covered by NDC 
system 
Time horizon  No coverage of 
NDC system 
Later cohorts of 
workers covered by 
“quasi-NDC” reforms 
(e.g., life expectancy 
adjustments to benefits 
or retirement age)  
Only some cohorts 
(e.g., new labor 
market entrants or 
those under age 50) 
covered by NDC 
system 
All employed workers, 
including those in 
labor force at time 
NDC introduced, 
covered by NDC 
system 
Exclusivity  No NDC pension 
tier 
N.A.  NDC-based pension is 
only one of several 
public pension tiers 
NDC is only public 
pension tier 
 Table 2. The NDC Pension Continuum in practice 
 
Provision  Sweden (NDC 
initiator; full NDC) 
Poland 
(Full NDC) 
Brazil   
(elements of  NDC) 
Advanced 
Funding 
PAYG plus buffer 
fund partially 
accumulated under 
old pension system 
PAYG + Buffer fund 
(surplus in 1
st pillar + 
privatization revenue 
+ 1% temporary 
contribution) 
Pay as you go (PAYG) 
Life 
Expectancy at 
retirement 
Unisex, account 
balances and 
benefits adjusted 
both before and after 
retirement 
Unisex, but calculated 
for life expectancy at 
the age of retirement 
Unisex  
Retirement 
age 
Flexible, with NDC 
and FDC pensions 
drawable no earlier 
than age 61; partial 
withdrawal possible 
minimum:  
60 (women)  
65 (men) 
Not defined for private 
sector, but 35/30 years 
of contribution 
required; notional r. 
based on work years 
Actuarial adjustment   
Inflation and 
economic 
growth 
Account balances 
and benefits 
adjusted for wage 
growth (initial 
benefit is higher 
than actuarial 
amount and adjusted 
for wage growth 
minus 1.6 percent) 
accumulation is wage 
growth + labor force 
growth; annuities 
indexed to consumer 
prices, unless real 
wages are falling, in 
which case they are 
uprated in line with 
nominal wages (i.e., 
cut in real terms) 
Benefits adjusted for 
inflation 
Payroll tax 
rate 
Fixed at 16% for 
NDC tier and 2.5% 
for FDC tier 
12.22% to NDC 
7.3% to FDC  
Fixed “in theory” at 
31% 
Redistribution 
across 
generations 
Eliminated once 
NDC system is fully 
phased in 
  Limited, but more for 
first generations 
before full wage 
histories are 
developed. 
Redistribution  In pension annuity,  In pension annuity,  In pension annuity,   50
within 
generations 
from shorter-lived to 
longer-lived 
pensioners, and 
from men to 
women. 
from shorter-lived to 
longer-lived 
pensioners, and from 
men to women. 
from shorter-lived to 
longer-lived 
pensioners, and from 
men to women. 
Coverage  Universal   Not universal; 
separate programs for 
farmers and uniformed 
services 
private sector 
Time horizon  Persons born 1938- 
1953 receive 
benefits partially in 
old system.  Persons 
born 1954 and later 
receive benefits 
entirely in new 
system. 
New system 
mandatory for all born 
beginning in 1949;  
FDC mandatory for 
people born after 31, 
December, 1968. 
Transition to phase-in 
the reform gives bonus 
5 years of contribution 
to women and 10 and 
5 years to female and 
male teachers. 
Exclusivity  No. Combined with 
smaller FDC tier 
and  inflation-
indexed guarantee 
pension for those 
with low lifetime 
earnings. 
No. Combined with 
FDC system, plus tax-
financed minimum 
pension supplement 
(for minimum 25 yrs. 
Contributions)  if 
NDC+FDC annuities 
are below minimum. 
yes. 
 
All Brazil information is from Pinheiro and Viera, (2000).  Poland information is from Góra and Rutkowski (2000) and Chlon-Dominczak and Góra (2003). 
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TABLE 3. POTENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STRUCTURAL VARIABLES AND NDC CHOICE 
 
    Innovation  Early “full” 
adoption 
Partial and/or Non-
Exclusive 
Adoption 
Later adoption  Consideration 
but Rejection 
Never Reaches 
Agenda 
Economic/ 
Demographic 
Constraints 
Aging 
pressure 
+ Very strong 
demographic aging 
pressures 
 
+ Very strong 
demographic aging 
pressures 
 
 
+ Strong demographic 
aging pressures 
- Moderate but 
increasing 
demographic 
aging pressures 
- Weak 
demographic 
aging pressures 
- Weak 
demographic 
aging pressures 
  Fiscal 
pressure 
+ Very high budget 
deficits and 
debt/GDP ratio 
 
+ High budget deficits 
and debt/GDP ratio 
+   Funded DC likely to 
play relatively 
larger role than 
NDC in multi-tier 
system where 
budget deficits and 
debt/GDP ratio are 
low 
+ Moderate but 
increasing budget 
deficits and 
debt/GDP ratio 
+ Declining 
budget 
pressure and 
debt/GDP ratio 
+ Low budget 
deficits and 
debt/GDP ratio 
  Payroll tax 
rates 
+ Very high payroll 
tax rates 
+ Very high payroll 
tax rates 
+ High payroll tax rates  + High or rising 
payroll tax rates 
  - Low payroll tax 
rates or no 
payroll tax 
Ideational 
Forces 
Strength of 
domestic 
forces 
favoring 
market-based 
pension 
reform 
+ Strong exposure to 
international 
economic ideas 
- Funded DC rather 
than NDC more 
likely to be adopted 
where ideologically 
conservative forces 
are very strong. 
 
+  Funded DC likely to 
play relatively larger 
role than NDC in 
multi-tier system 
where ideologically 
conservative forces 
are fairly strong 
 
    + Funded DC 
rather than NDC 
more likely to be 
adopted where 
ideologically 
conservative 
forces are very 
strong. 
  Participation 
in regional 
networks 
where NDC 
ideas 
common 
Not applicable  + Participation in 
regional networks 
with earlier 
adopters; view 
earlier adopters as 
peer countries 
+ Participation in 
regional networks 
with earlier 
adopters; view 
earlier adopters as 
peer countries 
+ Outside regional 
networks 
including early 
adopters 
= Regional network 
effect should 
dissipate as NDC 
ideas are fully 
diffused inter- 
   nationally 
  + Country is 
outside regional 
networks of early 
NDC adopters 
= Regional 
network effect 
should dissipate 
as NDC ideas are 
fully diffused 
inter-   52
   nationally 
  Interaction 
with IFIs and 
other 
supranational 
organizations 
Not applicable  + Supra-national 
institutions (1) press 
for pension 
expenditure 
reductions and (2) 
introduce and 
support NDC-based 
reforms 
    + Supra-national 
institutions 
press for 
pension 
expenditure 
cuts and 
support NDC-
based reforms, 
but have 
limited 
bargaining 
leverage 
+ Low contact with 
IFIs 
Policy 
feedbacks 
Strong 
earnings-
related 
pension tier 
+ Strong earnings-
related component 
in pension system 
+ High replacement 
rates 
 
+ Strong earnings-
related component in 
pension system 
+ High replacement 
rates 
 
+  Strong redistribution 
in public earnings-
related pension 
system 
  - Flat-rate benefit 
in current DB 
-  Prior adoption of 
FDC reform 
-  Flat-rate benefit 
in current DB 
  Replacement 
rates 
+ High replacement 
rates 
+ High replacement 
rates 
      - Low replacement 
rates 
  Payroll tax 
records 
+ Complete payroll 
tax records 
+ Complete payroll tax 
records 
+ Complete payroll tax 
records 
+ Incomplete but 
improving payroll 
tax records 
  - Incomplete 
payroll tax 
records 
Political/ 
partisan 
constraints 
Multiple veto 
points in 
political 
system 
-  Multiple veto 
points in political 
system 
 
- Multiple veto points 
in political system 
+ Multiple veto points 
in political system 
+ Multiple veto 
points in political 
system 
+ Multiple veto 
points in 
political 
system 
 
  Availability 
of 
cartelizing 
mechanism
s+ 
+ Political 
mechanisms 
available to 
overcome interest 
group opposition to 
losses resulting 
from NDC-based 
reform 
  -   Political 
mechanisms 
available to 
overcome interest 
group opposition to 
losses resulting 
from NDC-based 
reform 
     
 
+  Condition makes it more likely that country will be in this category 
-   Condition makes it less likely that country will be in this category 
=  Condition makes it likely that effects of other variables of this type will become less important in their effects   53
    Blank cells indicate no hypothesized relationship between this condition and outcome category     54
TABLE 4. COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS AND NDC REFORM OUTCOMES 
 
Country    Sweden  Italy  Germany  Brazil  Uruguay  United 
States 
Outcome    Full NDC system 
adopted 
Partial NDC 
system adopted 
with long phase-in 
Elements of NDC 
adopted, retracted 
and readopted 
NDC-based reform 
adopted for private 
sector 
Mixed DB-
Funded DC 
reform. 
NDC not on 
agenda 
Economic/ 
Demographic 
Constraints 
Aging pressure (% 
population 65+ in 
parentheses) 
Very high (17.4%)  Very high (17.8%)  Very high (16.1%)  Low (5.1%)  High (12.9%)  High 
(12.3%) 
  Fiscal pressure  Very strong in 
early 1990s 
Very strong  Very strong  Very strong  Very strong  Moderate 
  Payroll tax rates 
(total payroll tax 
rates in 
parentheses) 
High (26.09%  Very high 
(41.11%) 
Very high 
(40.91%) 
High (27.65%)   Very high 
(35.5%) 
Moderate 
(22.7%) 
Ideational 
Forces 
Strength of domestic 
forces favoring 
market-based 
pension reform 
Weak  Weak  Fairly weak  Weak  Weak  Strong 
  Interaction with IFIs 
and other 
supranational 
organizations 
No  No interaction with 
IFIs, but EU 
pressure to reduce 
pension spending 
No interaction with 
IFIs, but EU 
pressure to reduce 
pension spending 
Yes, exposed to 
Swedish NDC 
model at World 
Bank pension 
conference. 
Yes, with Inter-
American 
Development 
Bank, which 
presented NDC 
option in 1992. 
No 
  Participation in 
regional networks 
where NDC ideas 
common 
Became hub of 
network 
Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Policy 
feedbacks 
Strong earnings-
related pension tier 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes 
  Replacement rates  Very high  Very high  Very high  Moderate (in 
private sector) 
 
 
High  Moderate 
  Complete payroll tax 
records 
Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No   Yes 
Political/  Multiple veto points  Weak  Strong  Weak  Strong  Strong  Strong   55
partisan 
constraints 
in political system? 
  Mechanisms for 
overcoming policy 
gridlock? 
Strong  Mixed  Declining  Weak  Weak  Weak 
 
Source for data on aging and payroll tax rates: U.S. Social Security Administration, Social Security Programs Throughout the World, most recent editions. 
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Table 5. Potential Erosion in NDC Pension Systems 
 
Provision  “Strong” or “Full” NDC  Erosion possibilities  Conditions facilitating erosion 
Advanced 
Funding 
PAYG with inclusion of buffer funds in benefit 
calculations 
Government transfers funds from 
buffer funds to general Treasury 
Government experiences fiscal crisis 
Life 
Expectancy at 
retirement 
Future benefit levels adjust automatically for 
increases in longevity 
Government freezes annuitization 
tables 
Weak rules in place on regularity and automaticity of 
life expectancy adjustments  
Weak autonomy of statistical agencies 
Retirement age  No standard retirement age with full actuarial 
adjustment for earlier or later and partial 
retirement 
Higher non-actuarial benefits re-
established for workers who have 
reached a specified age or number 
of years in employment 
Strong unions; pensions become electoral issue 
Inflation and 
economic 
growth 
Benefits tied fully to economic growth  Government continues inflation 
adjustments in annuities and 
account balances when economy is 
shrinking 
Economic recession and/or decline in labor force 
Payroll tax rate  Fixed payroll tax rate  Increase in payroll tax  NDC tier experiences cash-flow crisis resulting from 
demographic “bulge” 
    Decrease in payroll tax rate  Government seeks economic stimulus during recession 
Redistribution 
across 
generations 
Barred within NDC tier   Transition rules made more 
generous after initial NDC 
implementation 
Transition rules in place create highly visible 
disparities between adjacent cohorts of retirees 
Redistribution 
within 
generations 
Barred within NDC tier unless financed by 
payments from government or others with respect 
to non-employment activity. Exception: NDC 
implicitly redistributes from men to women and 
other population sub-groups with longer life-
expectancy if single annuitization table is used 
Government imputes NDC credits 
for non-employment activity rather 
than actually making contributions 
Government experiences fiscal crisis 
Coverage  All workers in specified age cohorts are covered 
by NDC system 
Favored groups win exclusion from 
NDC reform after initial inclusion 
Favored groups have strong leverage in political 
system (e.g., public sector unions, military) 
Time horizon  All employed workers, including those in labor 
force at time NDC introduced, covered by NDC 
system 
Time horizon for phase-in of NDC 
pension extended 
Transition rules in place create highly visible 
disparities between adjacent cohorts of retirees 
Exclusivity  NDC is only public pension tier  New means-tested tier or minimum 
guarantee  created or existing one 
expanded after implementation of 
NDC 
Income inequality or poverty among the elderly 
increase after implementation of NDC system  (May 
also be pressures for expanding pension guarantee 
outside NDC tier if that benefit is not automatically 
adjusted for wage growth)   57
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ENDNOTES 
                                                   
1 The research reported herein was partially funded pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social 
Security Administration (SSA) funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium at Boston 
College.  The opinions and conclusions are solely those of the authors and should not be 
construed as representing the opinions or policy of SSA or any agency of the Federal 
Government. The authors would like to thank Daniele Franco, Agneta Kruse and Edward Palmer 
for extensive and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. 
2 While Palmer and Góra (2003) emphasize the financial stability of NDC pension schemes, 
Kruse 2003 argues that there remains a possibility of financial instability in NDC systems unless 
there is an automatic balancing mechanism (as in Sweden.) Agneta Kruse, (2002): ”Ageing 
populations and intergenerational risk-sharing in payg pension schemes.” WP 2002:18, Dept of 
Economics, Lund university. www.nek.lu.se/publications.  
3  In this respect, the Swedish NDC scheme follows the practice of the pre-reform Swedish 
earnings-related pension. But buffer funds are by no means unique to Sweden, or to NDC 
systems. A number of other countries faced with deteriorating demographic situations have 
developed such funds in their defined-benefit pension programs, including the United States, 
Canada, and (more recently) New Zealand. See Palacios and Iglesias, 2001; Palacios, 2003; 
Weaver, 2004. 
4 A finding of a future deficit in the CPP’s triennial review process sets in motion a process 
under which Ministers from Ottawa and the provinces are supposed to agree on any needed 
changes to keep the plan viable; if they do not agree, contribution rates will increase 
automatically to meet half of the anticipated deficiency (phased in over three years), and 
indexation of the CPP will be frozen for the next three years unless cabinet ministers agree to 
override these procedures. See Slater and Robson, 1999, pp. 6-7. 
5 Because the adjustment of contributions is not automatic, but is subject to the political process, 
it typically lags considerably the emergence of deficits in the DB system. Such ex post 
adjustments have been criticized for their inefficiency and for constituting a tax on younger 
generations. See Palmer and Góra 2003, 5-6. 
6 There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in Sweden the NDC accounts are credited for 
limited time spent out of the work force for child care, mandatory service (such as military), and 
education. 
7 The Polish government is easing out certain early retirement privileges by financing “bridge 
pensions” for uniformed services, wherein the government makes additional contributions to 
finance a pension paid from early retirement age to the normal retirement age established under 
the 1997 reform law, see Góra and Rutkowski, 2000. 
8 A substantial literature on policy diffusion in a variety of sectors among the American states 
suggests that innovating states—those who first design and implement a reform—are found 
predominantly among relatively wealthy states with high technocratic capacity and slack 
resources (see the discussion in Orenstein, 2003). The  fact that NDC was pioneered in Sweden, 
a wealthy country with strong technocratic capacity in the pension sector, is consistent with this 
line of argument. 
9 Tavits (2003) in a review of Estonian pension reforms, categorizes causal variables affecting 
diffusion of innovation into three categories: internal determinants, external pressures and 
lesson-drawing. In Tavits’s categories, economic/demographic, policy feedbacks, 
Partisan/political constraints and societal constraints would all fit within the category of internal   65
                                                                                                                                                                   
determinants, while ideational forces would be divided into Tavits’s internal (strength of 
conservative forces), external and lesson-drawing (supra-national institutions) and lesson 
drawing (regional networks) categories.  
10 Prominent research suggests that individuals are, in essence, “cognitive misers” who, due to 
their finite information processing abilities, look to cues, heuristics or information shortcuts to 
make decisions more tractable (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Kahneman, Slovic and 
Tversky, 1982). Brooks (2003) has argued that competitiveness and status concerns were 
significant influences in the adoption of private pension reforms in developing countries seeking 
to attract foreign investment, and in Eastern European nations seeking accession to the European 
Union.  
11 Among the transition countries, Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia received considerable technical 
and financial support from the World Bank through conditional loans, but only Latvia adopted 
the NDC model. Nevertheless, the attraction to DC structures among Eastern European and 
Central Asian countries is striking, with FDC reforms adopted in Estonia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan 
and (in addition to NDC) in Poland, while NDC was adopted with later addition of an FDC tier 
in Latvia. Whether these governments chose financial or notional DC schemes may be 
understood to have been shaped by a combination of financing constraints, explained above, and 
political dynamics, discussed below.  
12 Diamond argues that while this diminishes the risk of excessive legislative intervention, the 
solvency promoted by automatic benefit reductions may enhance the risk that governments 
intervene too infrequently to balance the demographic adjustment to the contribution formula as 
well; see Diamond,  2002:86. 
13 Other aspects of political institutions may also affect capacity for policy change.  For example, 
countries that have relatively short electoral cycles may find it particularly difficult to make 
changes that impose visible losses on retirees and those approaching retirement.  See the 
discussion in Pal and Weaver (2003) and Bonoli (2000). 
14 See for example Immergut (1992).  Brooks argues that fragmentation of legislative power 
makes pension privatization less likely, but it is statistically significant only in some of her 
statistical models.  See Brooks, "Social Protection and Economic Integration," p. 515. The 
advantages of concentrated power and minimal veto points may, however, be at least partially 
offset by concentration of accountability in political systems: because voters know that it is the 
governing party that is imposing losses, governing parties may be reluctant to undertake 
initiatives that are very likely to incur retribution at the next election (Pierson and Weaver, 
1993). Because future losses may be obscured ex ante in NDC reforms, accountability concerns 
may be partly allayed. Moreover, even governing parties with very strong formal powers may 
refrain from enacting policies that are likely to be reversed by a later government. 
15  Italy adoped a Mixed-Member Majoritarian (MMM) electoral system in 1993.  The new 
electoral system “did not reduce party fragmentation, but it did provide powerful incentives for 
parties to enter into pre-electoral coalitions.” (D’Alimonte, 2001, p. 323). 
16 For example, in an analysis of the determinants of differences between pension reform in 
Estonia and Latvia, Targits (2003) argues that a record of successful domestically-initiated 
economic reform outside the pension sector in Estonia gave Estonian political elites greater 
confidence that they could successfully design and implement a home-grown pension reform, 
while a weaker Latvian record in this regard make them more inclined to borrow heavily from 
the Swedish NDC model. An extension of this argument would be that in countries where 
previous policy borrowing from supra-national organizations or through regional networks in   66
                                                                                                                                                                   
other sectors has been judged by political elites to be successful, they may be inclined to do it 
again in the pension sector. 
17 Bite and Zagorskis (2003: 41) report that pensions calculated in January 1997 ranged from as 
low as 8 Lats, to over 1,000 Lats; which was “shocking to the society” that was accustomed to 
the traditional equalizing role of social security. 